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COMPROMISING ON ABORTION* 
As Anna Quindlen has written, "Ordinary people know that 
abortion is something between killing and convenience," something 
that "is neither murder nor appendectomy." 1 Ordinary people can 
compromise on abortion. True believers cannot. And true believers 
seem to dominate the debate in North America-in Canada and the 
United States alike. 
Consider the Canadian experience. In 1988, the Canadian 
Supreme Court invalidated a long-standing abortion statute, but the 
Court's split decision and limited rationale effectively "remanded" 
the issue to the Canadian Parliament.2 Over the next three years, 
Parliament debated various legislative proposals, but each aroused 
the opposition of pro-life advocates, pro-choice advocates, or both. 
No proposal could muster majority support. 
The final Canadian proposal was the most interesting attempt 
at compromise, and it came within a single vote of passing. Re-
markable for its simplicity, this bill would have prohibited abortion 
except when a woman's doctor determined that her "physical, 
mental, or psychological health" was "likely to be threatened" if an 
abortion did not occur.J The bill drew no distinctions based on the 
period of gestation, and it left rape, incest, and fetal deformity as 
factors that might affect the evaluation of a woman's physical, 
mental, or psychological health. 
Although ordinary Canadians may have viewed this bill as a 
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3. The bill's primary substantive section provided as follows: 
(I) Every person who induces an abortion on a female person is guilty of an indict-
able offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years, unless 
the abortion is induced by or under the direction of a medical practitioner who is of 
the opinion that, if the abortion were not induced, the health or life of the female 
person would be likely to be threatened. 
(2) For the purposes of this section, "health" includes, for greater certainty, physi-
cal, mental and psychological health; "medical practitioner", in respect of an abor-
tion induced in a province, means a person who is entitled to practise medicine 
under the laws of that province; "opinion" means an opinion formed using gener-
ally accepted standards of the medical profession. 
(3) For the purposes of this section ... , inducing an abortion does not include using 
a drug, device or other means on a female person that is likely to prevent implanta-
tion of a fertilized ovum. 
Federal Abonion Bill Placed on the Table, Ottawa Citizen BS, col. 2 (Nov. 4, 1989). 
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sensible compromise, the bill provoked the fierce opposition of ad-
vocacy groups on both sides of the issue. Pro-life advocates con-
tended that the bill's broadly-worded exception would make its 
prohibition virtually meaningless. They argued that any woman 
seeking an abortion could locate a doctor who would find that her 
"psychological health" was "likely to be threatened" if the abortion 
were not performed. Thus, they claimed that the bill would author-
ize "wide open abortion"4 and would do "absolutely nothing to pre-
vent even a single abortion."s "We need a law that's going to 
protect every human being from the moment of conception," one 
activist stated. "We can't compromise on this."6 
Not to be outdone, pro-choice advocates likewise denounced 
the proposed law, which they regarded as "a degrading and uncon-
scionable assault on women's equality,"1 "a tremendous insult to 
physicians,"s and a "catastrophic" measure that would lead to "wo-
men being aborted by incompetent people, being aborted on kitchen 
tables."9 They claimed that the law would generate frivolous civil 
suits as well as unfounded criminal prosecutions, and that many 
doctors would simply stop performing abortions if the bill became 
law. In response to these objections, the Canadian Justice Minister 
issued an interpretation of the proposed law. She wrote that in con-
sidering the state of a woman's physical, mental, and psychological 
health, a doctor could take account of social and economic factors 
and the woman's personal aspirations. As long as the doctor's opin-
ion "is based on generally accepted standards of the medical profes-
sion and honestly held," she noted, "it is basically unassailable."Io 
But the pro-choice advocates were unmoved by this assurance. For 
them, the only acceptable law would be one that entrenched un-
qualified abortion rights.u 
Despite the clamor of the activists on both sides, the bill was 
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supported by people in the middle. One supporter in Parliament 
undoubtedly spoke for many Canadians when he applauded the 
bill's "reasonable, pragmatic and common sense" approach.12 With 
this support from the center, the bill passed by a narrow margin in 
the House of Commons. In the Senate, however, the bill died on a 
dramatic 43-to-43 tie vote, with an unlikely alliance of pro-life and 
pro-choice forces combining to defeat the measure.J3 The compro-
mise thus failed, and the Canadian Parliament now has put the 
abortion issue aside for the present. But the political debate in Can-
ada-described by one participant as "a civil war"-continues 
unabated.I4 
What about on this side of the border? As the United States 
Supreme Court continues to return the issue of abortion to the 
political process, must the debate be endless? At the level of indi-
vidual moral judgment, perhaps it must. Abortion raises issues of 
personal morality that seem to defy resolution. In terms of the law, 
however, the Canadian example suggests that compromise might be 
possible. Canadian society is comparable to ours (although not 
identical), and though the Canadian legislation failed in the end, it 
came within a whisker of adoption. A similar approach might pro-
vide the basis for an abortion compromise in the United States. 
True believers, both pro-life and pro-choice, see abortion as an 
issue of moral principle, an issue on which compromise is morally 
unacceptable. Any compromise on abortion therefore cannot be 
based on the views of true believers. The search for compromise 
and political consensus must focus instead on a more pragmatic 
sense of morality-call it the ordinary morality of ordinary people. 
What is the ordinary morality of ordinary Americans on the 
question of abortion? Ordinary Americans are neither "pro-life" 
nor "pro-choice," although they favor both life and choice. On the 
one hand, a majority of Americans believe that abortion is a matter 
of public concern and that the law should prohibit at least some 
abortions-call them "convenience" abortions-even in the early 
stages of pregnancy. At the same time, however, most Americans 
believe that abortion decisions generally should be left to women 
and their doctors.Is It seems that ordinary Americans would like 
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the law to reflect a public morality treating abortion as presump-
tively evil, if sometimes necessary, but they worry about having the 
government supplant the process of individual decision-making. 
To implement this ordinary morality, why not something like 
the Canadian approach? Indeed, the Canadian proposal would 
seem to fit America's ordinary morality like a glove: abortion 
would be prohibited as presumptively evil, but with an exception 
that would permit individual women and their doctors to decide 
when abortions would be necessary nonetheless. 
To be sure, this legislation might not be the perfect compro-
mise. To better reflect the ordinary morality favoring life, perhaps 
the law should be more restrictive for abortions late in pregnancy. 
To better reflect the ordinary morality favoring choice, perhaps the 
law's exception should be tied not to the judgment of a woman's 
doctor, but rather to the reasonable and good-faith certification of 
the pregnant woman herself, after consultation with her doctor. 
And perhaps the law should deal with subsidiary issues that the 
Canadian proposal does not specifically address, such as the ques-
tion of parental consent. 
Although it surely could be improved, the Canadian legislation 
points in the direction of a viable political compromise, a compro-
mise grounded in America's ordinary morality. Regardless of 
whether the exception were tied to the woman's certification or that 
of her doctor, enforcement would be difficult, and probably would 
occur only in extreme cases. In general, we would be required to 
trust the good-faith decisions of pregnant women and their doctors. 
But that is precisely what the ordinary morality favoring choice 
would seem to demand. At the same time, the law would clearly 
reflect the ordinary morality favoring life, and pregnant women and 
their doctors would be forced to confront this reality. 
If enacted into law by the various states, or better yet by Con-
gress, this type of compromise might move us beyond the belliger-
ent and polarizing debate in which we are now submerged. 
Thoughtful minds would continue to address the morality of partic-
ular abortion decisions, but the signs, the chants, and the slogans 
might gradually retreat from the scene. In time, as the religious and 
philosophical dialogue continued, perhaps the ordinary morality on 
on the matter and regard advocates on one side or the other as 'extremists.' " E.J. Dionne, 
Jr., Poll Finds Ambivalence on Abortion Persists in U.S., N.Y. Times Al8, col. l (Aug. 3, 
1989). Fifty-six percent of those surveyed, for example, said abortion should be illegal if the 
woman's only reason is to avoid the interruption of her professional career. But sixty-three 
percent also said that "if a woman wants to have an abortion and her doctor agrees to it," she 
generally should be permitted to have the abortion. See id. 
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abortion might change, and there might then be room for a new 
political resolution. 
If ordinary people controlled the debate, a compromise 
modeled on the Canadian legislation might be a real possibility in 
the United States. Instead, the activists continue to push and to 
pull, fighting for "in your face" legislative victories. Ordinary peo-
ple stand on the sidelines, and the prospect of compromise seems 
distressingly remote. 
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